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Abstract  
In the context of bullying in a nursing workplace, we test the argument that an 
offender’s perspective-taking promotes victim conciliation, mediated by perceived 
perspective-taking, that is, the extent to which the victim perceives the offender as taking 
their perspective. Perceived perspective-taking facilitates the attribution of moral emotions 
(remorse, etc.) to the offender, thereby promoting conciliatory victim responses. However, 
perceived perspective-taking would be qualified by the extent to which the severity of 
consequences expressed in the offender’s perspective-taking matches or surpasses the 
severity for the victim. In Studies 1 and 2 (Ns = 141 and 122), victims indicated greater trust 
and/or forgiveness when the offender had taken the victim’s perspective. This was 
sequentially mediated by perceived perspective-taking and victim’s inference that the 
offender had felt moral emotions. As predicted, in Study 2 (but not Study 1) severity of 
consequences qualified victims’ perceived perspective-taking. Study 3 (N = 138) examined 
three potential mechanisms for the moderation by severity. Victims attributed greater 
perspective-taking to the offender when the consequences were less severe than voiced by the 
offender, suggesting victims’ appreciation of the offender’s generous appraisal. Attributions 
of perspective-taking and of moral emotions to the offender may play an important role in 
reconciliation processes. 
 
Key outcome: To the extent that victims perceive the offender as taking their perspective 
(perceived perspective-taking), they infer that the offender feels more moral emotions, 
prompting victims to be more conciliatory. Perceived perspective-taking benefits from the 
offender over-stating the consequences to the victim. 
 
Keywords: perceived perspective-taking, bullying, inferred moral emotions, trust, 
forgiveness, severity of harm  
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I feel you feel what I feel: Perceived perspective-taking promotes victims’ conciliatory 
attitudes because of inferred emotions in the offender 
Imagine you are a nurse and a colleague bullies you in front of the other nurses. Later, 
(s)he approaches you, saying “I thought about how that must have made you feel, and I won’t 
do it again in the future”. Does this purported empathic concern act of contrition make you 
feel more conciliatory?  
As illustrated above, the question in the present research is whether another’s act of 
perspective-taking can facilitate conciliatory attitudes following wrongdoing. Perspective-
taking involves the active consideration of another person’s situation, feelings or experiences 
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Typically research has focused on how perspective-taking 
can lead the perspective taker to show more prosocial, less egocentric, and less prejudicial 
behaviour (e.g., Galinsky, Ku & Wang, 2005). However, it is also plausible that the person 
whose perspective is taken responds favourably to such an act, to the extent that he or she 
recognizes or perceives the perspective-taking. Perceived perspective-taking is the extent to 
which an individual believes their perspective has been taken by someone else (Goldstein, 
Vezich & Shapiro, 2014). The goal of the present research is to investigate how perceived 
perspective-taking mediates between an offender’s perspective-taking and victim’s 
conciliatory attitudes, as well as factors that can facilitate (or inhibit) perceived perspective-
taking. We consider these processes in the context of bullying, specifically, in a nursing 
workplace where a nurse bullies other nurses. Bullying is an example of an interpersonal 
“transgression” (a harmful or illegal act; Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). We refer to the 
person who commits the bullying as the “offender” and to the recipient of the bullying as the 
“victim”. We investigate the effects of an offender taking the perspective of the victim 
following a workplace transgression.  
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First, we argue that when victims perceive the offender’s perspective-taking, they 
make inferences about the moral emotions (shame, guilt, remorse) felt by the offender. The 
attribution of such moral emotions is expected to promote conciliatory attitudes towards the 
offender. Second, we argue that these effects are more prominent when the consequences of 
the transgression are less severe for the victims compared to more severe. Third, we argue 
that the perceived match between the actual consequences of the transgression for the victim 
and the offender’s voiced consequences in the perspective-taking statement underlies the 
moderating role of severity of consequences. 
Perceived Perspective-Taking, Emotional Inferences, and Conciliatory Attitudes 
In the context of transgressions, an offender taking the victim’s perspective should 
convey an understanding of the victim’s suffering caused by the offender’s wrongdoing. In 
turn, an offender’s acknowledgement and understanding of the victim’s suffering may foster 
the victim’s belief that his or her perspective has been taken by the offender. Acknowledging 
the victim’s harm indicates to the victim that the offender understands the extent of the 
wrongdoing and feels responsibility for the wrongdoing. Appraisals of responsibility or 
blame for immoral behaviour tend to elicit moral emotions such as shame, guilt, and remorse 
in the agent (e.g., Roseman, 1984). Similarly, a victim may infer that the offender 
experiences these moral emotions when the offender has (successfully) taken the victim’s 
perspective, even when the offender does not explicitly express those emotions. This is 
because people have prototypes of emotions and emotional states and these can be used to 
infer emotions even if they are not explicitly expressed (see Oatley, 1999a, 1999b). Thus 
when a victim (a nurse) perceives that the (bully) offender acknowledges correctly their 
suffering for which the offender is responsible, the victim will infer that the offender feels 
shame, guilt, and remorse about the wrongdoing (bullying).  
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Inferences of offender’s felt remorse, guilt, and shame indicate to the victim that the 
offender has reflected on their welfare. Hence the victim believes that it is unlikely that the 
offender will repeat the wrongdoing and can therefore trust the offender to behave better in 
the future. Trust is an acceptance of vulnerability based on expectations of benevolence of the 
other (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). We therefore expect that these inferred moral 
emotions (remorse, guilt, shame) will be positively associated with trust and conciliatory 
attitudes towards the offender, promoting potential reconciliation processes (e.g., Dovidio, 
Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).  
Thus, we expect that perceived perspective-taking will increase conciliatory attitudes 
towards the offender through inferences of offender’s moral emotions when acknowledging 
the victim’s suffering. As such, our research extends the work of Goldstein et al. (2014) who 
investigated perceived perspective-taking in a set of six experiments examining participants’ 
preferences for a perspective taker in a neutral, non-transgression context. They found that 
perceptions of empathy in the perspective taker mediated the relationship between perceived 
perspective-taking and increased liking of the perspective taker. However, in the context of a 
wrongdoing at least, the offender’s acknowledgement of the victim’s suffering may well 
affect both the victim’s perceptions of perspective-taking and attributions of moral emotions 
like guilt, shame and remorse. We therefore argue that in such contexts these inferred moral 
emotions are the more relevant downstream mediating mechanism. As such, we propose that 
inferred moral emotions mediate the relationship between perceived perspective-taking and 
conciliatory attitudes.  
Severity of the Consequences of Harm: Success versus Failure of Perspective-taking 
Victims’ conciliatory attitudes to offenders are likely to depend on the severity of the 
consequences of the wrongdoing, and how much harm or suffering the offenders have 
caused victims. For example, research has shown that severe consequences for a victim are 
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associated with a loss of trust in the offender (Menzies-Toman & Lydon, 2005) and even in 
other people (Koestenbaum, 2011). More severe consequences predict also less forgiveness 
for the offender (Fincham, Jackson, & Beach, 2005; Kotz, 2016). As such we can expect 
that severe consequences of the transgression experienced by the victim will reduce 
conciliatory attitudes towards the offender.  
However, the severity of consequences may furthermore condition the effects of 
offenders’ reparative statements. For example, Darby and Schlenker (1982) showed that, 
while with severe consequences victims were harsher in their judgments of offenders, more 
elaborate apologies led to less blame and more forgiveness. And, indeed, offenders tend to 
offer more elaborate apologies for wrongdoing with more severe consequences (Schlenker 
& Darby, 1981). Hence we argue that the severity of consequences may qualify whether an 
offender’s attempt at, or claimed act of, perspective-taking will lead victims to perceive it as 
such. 
One reason why an offender’s perspective-taking may fail to be recognized as such 
by the victim is that it fails to acknowledge the seriousness of the victim’s suffering. 
Operationally, such a failure of the offender’s perspective-taking could be realised by 
varying the severity of the consequences for the victim whilst keeping the offender’s 
communicated acknowledgement of the victim’s suffering constant. Hence the second key 
factor in our research involves the manipulation of severity of the consequences for victims. 
When the consequences are severe but the offender suggests they are moderate, we 
anticipate that the offender will be seen as insufficiently acknowledging the intensity of the 
harm done, reducing the victim’s perception that the offender has taken their perspective. 
Conversely, when the consequences are less severe and communicated as moderate by the 
offender, the victim will consider that the offender more appropriately appreciated the 
consequences for the victim, thus increasing perceived perspective-taking. We therefore 
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anticipate that, ceteris paribus, less severe consequences of the harm doing will amplify 
perceived perspective-taking; this, in turn, will increase conciliatory attitudes (outcome 
variable) through increased shame, guilt, and remorse (mediators) compared to when the 
consequences of the harm doing are more severe. 
In Study 1, using the example of workplace bullying in a nursing context, the 
victim’s conciliatory attitudes are operationalized by trust in the offender, as trust is a 
socially important conciliatory attitude (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). 
We expect that when victims perceive the offender’s perspective-taking, they make 
inferences about the moral emotions (shame, guilt, remorse) felt by the offender. The 
attribution of such moral emotions is expected to promote trust towards the offender. 
However, we expect that victims are more likely to perceive perspective-taking when the 
consequences of the transgression are less severe for the victims compared to more severe. 
In Study 2, we aim to replicate these findings and extend our conceptualization of 
conciliatory attitudes by including both trust in, and forgiveness of, the offender. In Study 3, 
we investigate possible mechanisms that underlie the moderating role of severity of 
consequences in promoting conciliatory attitudes towards the offender.  
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated the impact of perspective-taking and severity of the 
consequences for a victim of a transgression on trust in the offender. As mentioned before, 
the research was set in a nursing context. Nursing is an occupation that is notorious for 
workplace bullying among employees (e.g., Hutchinson, Jackson, Wilkes & Vickers, 2008; 
Johnston, Phanhtharath & Jackson, 2009). Participants were instructed to imagine being 
nurses and read a description of a nurse who was a victim of workplace bullying that 
resulted in either severe or less severe consequences for them. Participants then learned that 
an offender wished to cease such behaviours, publicly renouncing future bullying. The 
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offender reasoned their decision by detailing either the victim’s perspective (perspective-
taking) or the perspective of the workplace (control group). Our choice for the control 
condition was based on the idea that both conditions should be comparable in terms of an 
objection to future bullying but with divergent concerns; the focus was either on the 
psychological wellbeing of the victims or the prosperity of the workplace.  
We predicted that victim perspective-taking would lead to more perceived 
perspective-taking compared to taking the perspective of the workplace. Moreover, when the 
consequences of the bullying for the victim were less severe, the content of the bully’s 
renouncement was expected to correspond more to the victim’s actual feelings compared to 
the more severe condition. Hence, we predicted that less severe consequences would lead to 
more perceived perspective-taking than more severe consequences for the victim. 
Specifically, we expected perspective-taking and severity of the consequences to interact in 
their effects on perceived perspective-taking. That is, when the consequences are less 
severe, taking the victim’s perspective would produce higher ratings on perceived 
perspective-taking than taking the workplace perspective. When the consequences are more 
severe, we predicted less difference in perceived perspective-taking between the two 
perspective conditions. Thus, severity of consequences would moderate the effects of 
perspective-taking on perceived perspective-taking.  
Moreover, we predicted that the relationship between perceived perspective-taking 
and trust in the offender would be mediated by inferences of moral emotions in the offender. 
In other words, we predicted a moderated mediation: when the consequences for the victim 
were less severe (compared to more severe), the offender’s perspective-taking would 
indirectly increase conciliatory attitudes (i.e., trust) on the part of the victim, sequentially 
mediated by perceived perspective-taking and attributions of moral emotions. 
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Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and forty-one participants were recruited 
from an Australian university first-year psychology student pool, (78% female; Mage = 
22.45, SDage = 7.50). The study used a 2 (perspective: victim, workplace) x 2 (severity of 
consequences: severe, less severe) between-subjects design. Participants accessed the 
questionnaire online by clicking on a link in the study advertisement and were randomly 
assigned to one of the 4 experimental conditions. 
Stimulus materials and procedure. The scenarios used depicted either severe or 
less severe consequences, and the bully renounced future bullying either by taking the 
nurse’s perspective or the workplace perspective. The basic scenario described a case of 
bullying among nurses at a hospital: ‘Imagine that you are a nurse. You have been 
employed at this hospital for one year. Bullying is vastly common among your team of 
nurses at this hospital. For the past year, you have been the victim of bullying by other 
nurses, including a nurse named Lisa. This group of nurses have addressed you by the 
nickname “stupid” and have rolled their eyes and laughed every time you’ve spoken’. 
Severity of consequences. The scenario continued with a description of the effects of 
the bullying on the victimised nurse. In the severe consequences condition the participants 
read: ‘You absolutely hate your working environment and fear going to work each day. You 
stress every night about your situation, which causes an inability to sleep. This morning, 
when travelling to work, you suffered a panic attack, as you have regularly over the past year, 
in anticipation of more bullying’. In the less severe consequences condition the participants 
read: ‘You feel awkward about your working environment and wary about going to work. 
You think about your situation every night before you go to sleep. This morning, when 
travelling to work, you thought about how you hope the bullying doesn’t occur again today’. 
Perspective-taking. The scenarios continued with a description of the bully’s 
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renunciation of bullying: ‘Today at work, Lisa (one of the bullying nurses) stands up at the 
morning staff meeting and says the following: “Although I have bullied other nurses myself, 
I think it is time that we stop bullying our co-workers.’” This was followed by the 
manipulation of perspective-taking. In the victim perspective condition the bully said: “We 
could be causing them pain and suffering like decreased confidence or self-worth. They 
might be losing sleep or worrying excessively as a result of our behaviour. Or they may 
dislike working here at the hospital because of us. I’ve put myself in the shoes of those we 
are victimising, and I think they would benefit from us stopping our nasty behaviour”. In 
the workplace perspective condition the bully said: “We could be decreasing job 
satisfaction among employees. This hospital might be experiencing high absenteeism or 
high turnover as a result of our behaviour. Or the quality of patient care here at the hospital 
may be suffering because of us. I’ve put myself in the shoes of the hospital, and I think they 




Manipulation check of severity of consequences. Participants responded on a Likert 
scale anchored 1 (Not at all severe) to 7 (Very severe) to the question “How would you rate 
the severity of the consequences of the bullying you were subjected to?” 
Unless otherwise indicated, all questions below were measured on 7-point Likert 
scales anchored at 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Very much). 
Perceived perspective-taking. A single item was used to measure the degree to which 
participants perceived the offender took their (i.e., the victim’s) perspective: “As a victim of 
bullying, how much do you feel Lisa took your perspective when she talked about the 
adverse consequences of her and others’ past behaviour?”  
Perceived moral emotions. Two items assessed perceived shame, adapted from the 
Internalized Shame Scale (Cook, 1988): “In your opinion, how insecure does Lisa feel 
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about others’ opinions of her?” and “How ashamed do you believe Lisa feels?” Two items 
measured perceived guilt, which were adapted from the Perceived Guilt Index (Otterbacher 
& Munz, 1973): “How guilty do you believe Lisa feels?” and “How much do you think Lisa 
believes her actions were unforgiveable?” Three items for perceived remorse were adapted 
from Fisher and Exline’s (2006) measure of remorse. “How remorseful [regretful, 
sorrowful] do you believe Lisa feels?”, α = .90. 
Trust. The measure of trust was partly adapted from Kim et al. (2004). Participants 
were asked “Do you trust Lisa?” Participants also responded on a Likert scale anchored 1 
(Definitely not) to 7 (Definitely yes) to answer the questions “Do you believe Lisa is a fair 
person?” and “Do you believe Lisa will one day repeat her bullying behaviour?” (reverse-
coded), α = .72. 
Results and Discussion 
Scale inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are 
shown in Table 1. As expected, perceived perspective-taking, perceived moral emotions, 
and trust were significantly and positively inter-correlated. Perceived severity of the 
consequences was not significantly correlated with the above variables.  
Manipulation check. A 2 (perspective: victim, workplace) × 2 (severity of 
consequences: severe, less severe) between subjects ANOVA was used to test the severity 
manipulation check. The main effect of severity of consequences was significant, showing 
that the manipulation of severity was successful, F(1, 135) = 8.94, p = < .001, ƞp
2
= .06. 
Participants in the severe consequence condition (M = 5.79, SD = 1.52) reported 
significantly higher scores on perceived severity than participants in the less severe 
consequence condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.25). The main effect of perspective-taking was 
non-significant, F(1, 135) = .01, p = .94, as was the interaction between severity and 
perspective, F(1, 135) = .16, p = .69. 
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Comparison between conditions. The means and standard deviations for each 
variable as a function of perspective-taking and severity of consequences are presented in 
Table 2. We performed 2 (perspective: victim, workplace) × 2 (severity of consequences: 
severe, less severe) between-subjects ANOVAs on the dependent variables. For perceived 
perspective-taking, the main effects of perspective-taking and severity of consequences 
were significant, F(1, 135) = 52.66, p < .001, ƞp
2 
=.28, and F(1, 135) = 5.07, p = .03, ƞp
2 
= 
.04, respectively. The main effects showed that relative to a workplace perspective, victim 
perspective-taking resulted in more perceived perspective-taking (Ms = 2.51 vs. 4.16, SDs = 
1.42 vs. 1.36, respectively), and less severe consequences resulted in perceived perspective-
taking compared to severe consequences (Ms = 3.53 vs. 3.14, SDs = 1.69 vs. 1.52). 
However, the predicted interaction between severity of consequences and perspective-
taking was not significant, F(1, 135) = 1.06, p = .30.  
 For perceived moral emotions in the offender, the main effect of perspective-taking 
was significant, F(1, 135) = 22.41, p < .001, ƞp
2
= .14, such that compared to the workplace 
perspective, victim perspective-taking led to stronger perceived moral emotions (Ms = 2.53 
vs. 3.53, SDs = 1.06 vs. 1.39). The main effect of severity of consequences and the 
interaction between severity of consequences and perspective-taking were not significant, 
F(1, 135) = .15, p = .70, and F(1, 135) = .10, p = .75, respectively. 
 For trust in the offender, the main effects of perspective-taking and severity of 
consequences were marginally significant, F(1, 135) = 3.41, p = .067, ƞp
2 
= .02, and F(1, 135) 
= 3.72, p = .056, ƞp
2 
= .03, respectively. That is, relative to the workplace perspective, victim 
perspective-taking led to more trust (Ms = 2.07 vs. 2.33, SDs = .94 vs. .91) and less severe 
consequences led to more trust than severe consequences (Ms = 2.34 vs. 2.06, SDs = .96 vs. 
.87). The interaction between severity of consequences and perspective-taking was not 
significant, F(1, 135) = .67, p = .41. 
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Path Analyses. As the interaction between perspective-taking and severity of the 
consequences on perceived perspective-taking was non-significant, we used AMOS 22 to test 
an unqualified mediation model (see Figure 1). The model fit was weak (see Kline, 1998); 
2(6) = 12.80, p = .05,  2/df ratio =2.13, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .96, and Root-Mean-
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .09. Modification indices suggested that there 
was additional covariance in the relationship between severity of consequences and trust that 
needed to be accounted for. Including a direct path between the two resulted in a model that 
fit the data better;  2(5) = 7.77, p = .17,  2/df ratio = 1.55, CFI = .98, and RMSEA = .06. 
However, inclusion of this path did not substantially affect the rest of the model. 
The indirect effects of both perspective-taking and severity of consequences on 
inferred moral emotions through perceived perspective-taking were significant. These moral 
emotions predicted then trust in the offender (see Table 3 for the indirect effects). Thus, there 
was good support for the predicted relationship between perceived perspective-taking and 
trust via inferred moral emotions, suggesting that perceived perspective-taking may have 
positive effects in a conflict situation. The more victims of bullying perceived that their 
perspective was taken by the offender the more they trusted the offender due to inferences of 
more moral emotions in the offender. This study is the first to demonstrate that the inferred 
moral emotions of guilt, shame, and remorse may explain the influence of perceived 
perspective-taking on trust. 
Nevertheless, our hypothesis about the moderating effects of the severity of 
consequences was not supported. This may be due to the fact that the experimental 
manipulation of severity was not strong enough for it to demonstrate differential fit of the 
offender’s communicated perspective-taking with the victim’s situation. This possibility is 
addressed in Study 2. 
Study 2 
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In Study 2 we sought to create a clearer contrast between the levels of severity of 
consequences in the two conditions. To that end, in the low severity condition we made the 
victim’s feelings about working at the hospital less negative and indicated that the victim had 
the opportunity to leave the current work environment. We expect to find evidence of a 
moderated mediation whereby the positive effect of perspective-taking on perceived 
perspective-taking will be more pronounced when the consequences are less severe, which, in 
turn, increases trust through inferred moral emotions. 
Study 2 also extended on Study 1 by adding another outcome variable reflecting 
conciliation: forgiveness. In the area of apologies, trust has been found to be associated with 
forgiveness (e.g., Berndsen, Hornsey, & Wohl, 2015; Dovidio et al., 2002; Hewstone, Cairns, 
Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). We included measures of trust 
and forgiveness as two parallel outcomes. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 122) were 68 second-year psychology 
students at an Australian university and 54 members of the Australian community recruited 
through an online forum (61% female; Mage = 24.84, SDage = 8.96). There were no 
differences between the two samples on any of the dependent variables (all ps > .09) and 
the 2-way and 3-way interactions involving type of sample were also not significant (all ps 
> .17). As in Study 1, the study used a 2 (perspective: victim, workplace) x 2 (severity of 
consequences: severe, less severe) between-subjects design. Likewise, participants accessed 
the questionnaire online by clicking on a link in the study advertisement and were randomly 
assigned to one of the 4 experimental conditions. There were 5 outliers on the measure of 
check perceived perspective-taking. These were re-coded by assigning them with a score 
that is “one unit larger (or smaller) than the next most extreme score in the distribution” 
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p.71). For example, when participant X has a score of 7 and 
the next extreme score is 5, participant X’s score is re-coded as 6. 
Stimulus materials and procedure. The procedure and stimulus materials were the 
same as in Study 1 with three exceptions. First, the less severe consequences condition read 
as follows: “You feel uncomfortable about your working environment and do not like going 
to work. You think about your situation and you believe that it will be better to look for 
another working environment. This morning, when travelling to work, you thought about 
how you hope the bullying doesn’t occur again today”. 
Second, we shortened the moral emotions measure by asking “How ashamed 
[guilty, remorseful, regretful] do you believe Lisa feels?”, α = .94.  
Third, we included a 15-item forgiveness scale that assesses state forgiveness (Rey 
et al., 2001). The items were measured on 9-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly 
agree). We made two adaptations: Items asking about “praying for” the offender and about 
“feeling ruined” were replaced with: “getting even with Lisa is not important to me” and 
“I’m able to forgive Lisa for her wrongful actions”, α = .76. 
The measures of perceived perspective-taking and trust (α = .78) were the same as 
in Study 1. 
Results  
Scale inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are 
shown in Table 4. All variables (except for perceived severity of the consequences) were 
significantly and positively inter-correlated. These findings are similar to those in Study 1. 
Manipulation check of severity of consequences. A 2 (perspective: victim, 
workplace) × 2 (severity of consequences: severe, less severe) between subjects ANOVA 
was used to test the manipulation check. Confirming the success of the manipulation, 
ratings on felt severity were significantly higher in the severe consequence condition (M = 
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6.02, SD = .73) than in the less severe consequence condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.57), F(1, 
118) = 23.15, p  < .001, ƞp
2
= .16 (compared to ƞp
2 
= .06 in Study 1). The main effect of 
perspective-taking and the interaction between severity and perspective were not 
significant, F(1, 118) = .02, p = .89, and F(1, 118) = .78, p = .38, respectively. 
Comparison between conditions. The means and standard deviations for each 
variable as a function of perspective-taking and severity of consequences are presented in 
Table 5. Between-subjects ANOVAs with 2 (perspective: victim, workplace) × 2 (severity 
of consequences: severe, less severe) were conducted on the dependent variables and the 
results are presented in Table 6.  
For perceived perspective-taking
2
, the predicted main effects of perspective-taking 
and severity of consequences were significant and so was the interaction. Victim 
perspective-taking resulted in more perceived perspective-taking than taking the workplace 
perspective (Ms = 3.97 vs. 2.82, SDs = 1.46 vs. 1.34, respectively); and less severe 
consequences resulted in more perceived perspective-taking than more severe consequences 
(Ms = 3.87 vs. 2.94, SDs = 1.62 vs. 1.24, respectively). The interaction showed that, when 
the consequences were less severe, taking the victim’s perspective resulted in stronger 
perceived perspective-taking (p < .001) compared to taking the workplace perspective; in 
contrast, when the consequences were severe the difference between the two perspectives 
was not significant (p = .118; see Table 5).  
For perceived moral emotions in the offender, the main effects of perspective-
taking and severity of consequences were significant. Victim perspective-taking resulted in 
stronger attribution of moral emotions (Ms = 3.46 vs. 2.27, SDs = 1.51 vs. 1.01, 
respectively) than taking the workplace perspective, and less severe consequences resulted 
in stronger attribution of moral emotions than more severe consequences (Ms = 3.21 vs. 
2.53, SDs = 1.54 vs. 1.19, respectively).The interaction between perspective-taking and 
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severity of consequences was significant; when the consequences were less severe, taking 
the victim’s perspective resulted in stronger perceived moral emotions (p < .001) than the 
workplace perspective. When the consequences were more severe, taking the victim’s 
perspective also resulted in stronger inferences of moral emotions (p = .031), compared to 
the workplace perspective; but the effect was less pronounced than for less severe 
consequences.  
For trust in the offender, the main effects of perspective-taking and severity of 
consequences were significant and marginally significant, respectively. Victim perspective-
taking led to more trust than the workplace perspective (Ms = 2.47 vs. 1.86, SDs = 1.30 vs. 
.78, respectively) and less severe consequences led to more trust than more severe 
consequences (Ms = 2.35 vs. 1.99, SDs = 1.24 vs. .95, respectively). The interaction between 
perspective-taking and severity of consequences was significant. When the consequences 
were less severe, taking the victim’s perspective resulted in more trust (p < .001), compared 
to taking the workplace perspective. When the consequences were more severe, the 
difference between the two perspective condition was not significant (p = .516) 
For forgiveness, the main effect of perspective-taking was significant. Victim 
perspective-taking resulted in more forgiveness than taking the workplace perspective (Ms = 
3.74 vs. 3.41, SDs = .86 vs. .71, respectively). The main effect of severity of consequences 
was not significant. The interaction between perspective-taking and consequences was 
marginally significant. When the consequences were less severe, taking the victim’s 
perspective resulted in more forgiveness (p = .004) compared to taking the workplace 
perspective. When the consequences were more severe, the difference between the two 
perspective conditions was not significant (p = .674).` 
Path Analyses. We used AMOS 22 to test our hypothesized model of how the 
interaction between perspective-taking and severity of consequences predicted forgiveness 
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and trust (see Figure 2). As multi-group modelling allows one to compare parameters in 
different groups, we conducted a multi-group analysis with severity as the grouping variable 
(i.e., severity is the moderator). We first fixed all structural relations between the severity 
conditions to be equal,  2(19) =32.24. We compared this with the model in which the path 
from perspective-taking condition to perceived perspective-taking was unconstrained,  2(18) 
= 24.78. The difference between the models was significant, ∆ 2(1) =7.46, p = .006, 
indicating that the less constrained model provided a better overall model fit.  
The model fit for the unconstrained model was good (see Kline, 1998);  2(18) = 
24.78, p = .13,  2/df ratio = 1.38, CFI = .95, and RMSEA = .06. Consistent with our 
hypothesized model, severity of consequences moderated the relationship between 
perspective-taking and perceived perspective-taking; when the consequences were less severe 
(but not more severe), taking the perspective of the victim predicted higher levels of 
perceived perspective-taking. This, in turn, mediated the relationship between perspective-
taking and perceived moral emotions in the offender (see Figure 2); taking the victim’s 
perspective led to stronger attributions of moral emotions in the offender, via perceived 
perspective-taking. Stronger inferences of moral emotions, in turn, were then linked with 
more trust and forgiveness. Table 7 shows that all indirect effects were supported when the 
consequences were less severe and not when the consequences were severe (except for the 
indirect effect of perceived perspective-taking to trust), providing support for our 
hypothesized model. 
Study 2 therefore finds strong support for our moderated mediation hypothesis. When 
taking the victim’s (nurse’s) perspective, severity of consequences moderated the occurrence 
of perceived perspective-taking, which then affected conciliatory attitudes through perceived 
emotions in the offender (bully). Relative to the workplace perspective, when the consequences 
of bullying were less severe, taking the perspective of a victim led to stronger perceptions of 
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moral emotions in the offender through increased perceived perspective-taking. Inferred moral 
emotions, in turn, predicted greater trust and forgiveness.  
Discussion. What really underlies the qualifying effect of severity? There are three 
possibilities. First, it could be that severity provides a boundary condition for perceived 
perspective-taking; a limit to what victims believe allows a conciliatory response (see Fehr, 
Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). When the consequences are more severe, victims may be less willing 
to attribute perspective-taking to the offender, no matter what the offender states and 
acknowledges. Second, it could depend on the extent to which the consequences voiced by 
the offender match how the victim was actually affected by the wrongdoing. The more 
closely the offender understands and articulates the consequences for the victim, the more the 
victim will feel the offender took their perspective (see Koenig Kellas, Willer, & Trees, 
2013). That is, in the present study the offender statement might have fallen short when the 
consequences of the victim were more severe. We term this process an ‘objective’ match 
because it reflects a straightforward equivalence between the severity of the transgression 
experienced by the victim, and the severity of the transgression voiced by the offender. Third, 
it may not be the objective match between the consequences experienced by the victim and 
voiced by the offender that promotes perceived perspective-taking, but rather a subjective 
match (as perceived by the victim). For example, the offender may go beyond the factual 
consequences and instead demonstrate particular concern by appraising the consequences as 
even worse than they have actually been. This suggestion is consistent with literature on 
conversational processes. Leech (1983) has argued that in conversational exchanges showing 
generosity to another person can create harmonious social interactions. Generosity occurs 
when a speaker focuses entirely on what the hearer wants, which is subsequently interpreted 
as ‘generous’ by the hearer. Thus when the offender overstates the severity of consequences 
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for the victim, the victim interprets this as an altruistic act that can pave the way for positive 
interactions between offender and victim. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that in the less severe condition in Study 2, when the 
offender took the victim’s perspective, the offender voiced consequences that seemingly 
exceeded the actual consequences. The offender referred to the bullying as ‘causing pain and 
suffering, decreased confidence and self-worth, sleep loss and excessive worrying’, whereas 
the victim’s actual consequences merely referred to ‘feeling uncomfortable and not liking going 
to work, looking for another working environment’. This condition yielded the greatest level 
of perceived perspective-taking. So, is the perception of perspective-taking a matter of the 
offender going beyond the minimum and showing concern for the more serious consequences 
that might have been? Study 3 addresses these questions.  
Study 3 
 To be able to answer the question what exactly underlies the moderation effects and, 
hence, to better understand the role of perceived perspective-taking in promoting forgiveness, 
it was important to test whether severity of consequences exerted its effect independently of, 
or rather as a function of, the offender’s acknowledgement of their severity. For this, we 
needed to calibrate the offender’s (bully’s) acknowledgement to the victim’s (nurse’s) 
reported experience of the wrongdoing. Towards this end, we first conducted a pilot study. 
Pilot Study 
Using a similar nursing scenario as in Studies 1 and 2, we manipulated the actual 
severity of the consequences for the victim (low vs. high) and the severity of the 
consequences voiced in the perspective-taking statement (low vs. high). Two situations were 
designed as reflecting an objective match between actual and voiced consequences of 
bullying (low actual/low voiced consequences and high actual/high voiced consequences). 
The other two situations reflect a divergence between actual and voiced consequences of 
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bullying, where the offender either overstated or understated the consequences relative to 
how the victim reportedly experienced the consequences (i.e., low actual/high voiced 
consequences and high actual/low voiced consequences).  
 In a within-subject design, participants (N = 26) were presented with all four 
conditions. In the scenario, Stevie, a nurse, had been bullied by other nurses, including a 
nurse named Alex. When the actual consequences of bullying were less severe, participants 
read the following about Stevie’s situation: 
Stevie feels uncomfortable about the working environment and does not like going to 
work. Stevie has been thinking about it and wondered what the problem is. This 
morning, when traveling to work, Stevie thought about how he/she hopes the bullying 
doesn’t occur again today. Stevie loves being a nurse and believes he/she is good at it, 
but the current situation takes a bit the enjoyment out of it. 
When the actual consequences were more severe for Stevie, the scenario read as follows:  
Stevie absolutely hates the working environment and fears going to work each day. 
Stevie hates himself/herself and stresses every night about the situation, which causes an 
inability to sleep. This morning, when traveling to work, Stevie suffered a panic attack. 
Stevie has had them regularly over the past few weeks, in anticipation of more bullying. 
Stevie hates life. 
Each of the two scenarios was followed by two different offender statements. In one 
statement, Alex’ response at a staff meeting was designed as voicing less severe 
consequences:  
“Although I have bullied other nurses myself, I think it is time that we stop bullying our 
co-workers. We could be causing them discomfort and unease, like decreased motivation 
or enjoyment of their work. They might be pre-occupied in their thoughts and feel a bit 
troubled as a result of our behaviour. Or they may not enjoy working here at hospital so 
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much because of us. I’ve put myself in the shoes of those we are victimising, and I think 
they would benefit from us stopping our behaviour.” 
In another statement, Alex response was designed as voicing more severe consequences: 
“Although I have bullied other nurses myself, I think it is time that we stop bullying our 
co-workers. We could be causing them self-loathing and depression, like a loss of self-
worth or seeing themselves as a complete failure. They might have nightmares and be 
extremely terrified as a result of our behaviour. Or they may hate working here at 
hospital because of us. I’ve put myself in the shoes of those we are victimising, and I 
think they would benefit from us stopping our nasty behaviour”. 
After each combination of scenario severity and offender response, participants were 
presented with four questions using 7-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (Not at all) and 7 
(Very much). The first two items measured the objective match between actual consequences 
and offender-voiced consequences: ‘How accurately does Alex’s response describe Stevie’s 
situation?’, and ‘How well does Alex’s response match Stevie’s situation?’ (r = .91 to .97). 
Another two item were included for exploratory purposes, to tap how satisfying the victim is 
likely to be with the response: ‘How satisfied do you believe that Stevie is with Alex’ 
response?’, and ‘How pleased do you believe that Stevie is with Alex’s response?’ (r = .87 to 
.95). 
 The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8. Paired t-tests were 
conducted examining differences between the four situations in Table 8. Actual and 
offender voiced consequences designed to be equally severe (objective match) were 
perceived to be a better match (columns 1 and 3 in Table 8) than when they were designed 
to be differently severe (columns 2 and 4) (all ps < .001). There were no differences 
between the 2 matching situations (p = .293) or the 2 diverging situations (p = .119). The 
results confirmed that we succeeded in designing scenarios and offender responses that 
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were objectively equivalent in their (low or high) severity of consequences for the victim. 
Further, the ratings of presumed victim satisfaction showed that in the overstated condition 
(where the actual consequences of bullying were less severe but the offender voiced them 
more severely; column 2 in Table 8), the response satisfaction was significantly higher than 
in each of the other 3 situations (all ps < .01). In line with findings from Study 2, this 
suggests that it is the subjective match rather than an objective match that allows for the 
perception that the offender (bully) has truly adopted the perspective of the victim (nurse). 
The above findings suggest that there are two types of match between actual and voiced 
consequences of bullying: an objective match in terms of accuracy, and a subjective match in 
terms of satisfaction with the offender’s emphatic expression of their concern for the victim – 
a match that is ‘in the eye of the beholder’. Study 3 incorporates this distinction between an 
objective and subjective match. 
Main Study  
We used the piloted scenarios in our main study. Thus, we manipulated the severity 
consequences voiced in offender’s perspective statement (severe, less severe) and actual 
severity of consequences experienced by victim (severe, less severe) In all conditions the 
offender claims or implies to have taken the victim’s perspective (we dropped the condition 
of the offender taking the hospital’s perspective).  
Our goal was to test the three mechanisms through which participants (as the 
victims) attribute greater perspective-taking to the offender. First, as described above, it is 
possible that severe consequences of bullying form a boundary condition that undermines 
perceived-perspective taking and subsequent conciliatory attitudes (Fincham et al., 2005; 
Koestenbaum, 2011; Kotz, 2016; Menzies-Toman & Lydon, 2005). If this is the case we 
would expect to find a main effect of severity of consequences such that perceived-
perspective taking, inferred moral emotions and conciliatory attitudes are lower when the 
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actual consequences are more severe than when they are less severe. 
A second possibility is that victims may perceive more perspective-taking when 
there is an objective match between actual and voiced consequences, that is, when both are 
either low or high: the offender accurately assesses the consequences for the victim. If this is 
the case, we would expect an interaction between actual and voiced consequences such that 
perceived perspective-taking, inferred moral emotions, and conciliatory attitudes are higher 
when there is an objective match between actual and voiced consequences than when the 
actual and voiced consequences are divergent (‘objective match hypothesis’). 
As a final possibility, elaborated above, it is possible that the perpetrator voicing 
more severe consequences in the perspective-taking statement than the victim actually 
experienced promotes victim satisfaction and the perception of a subjective match. If so, we 
would expect an interaction between actual consequences and voiced consequences such 
that perceived perspective-taking, subsequent inferred moral emotions, and conciliatory 
attitudes are higher when the actual consequences of bullying are less severe but 
acknowledged by the offender as more severe (‘subjective match hypothesis’). 
To test these possibilities we also included a measure of perceived match in the 
current study. Participants were asked two questions, namely to what extent the perpetrator 
overestimated and underestimated the impact of bullying on the victim’s feelings. Ratings of 
overestimation were subtracted from the ratings of underestimation. This index shows to 
what extent participants felt the content of the perpetrator’s statement matched the 
consequences they experienced as the victim. A perfect match would be indicated by a value 
of zero; a negative value indicates overestimation, a positive value underestimation of the 
impact of the bullying on the victim. 
Study 3 also addresses two other limitations of Studies 1 and 2. First, previous 
research has shown that severe offences promote retribution or punishment in order to impose 
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a consequence for the offender (McCullough, 2008) rather than a constructive orientation to 
an offender. As such, retribution is included as an outcome variable in the current study. On 
the other hand, victims of severe personal crimes (as opposed to property crimes) have been 
found to feel fear of offenders (e.g., Dull & Wint, 1997). Hence fear is also included as an 
outcome variable in the present study. Above we mentioned that more severe consequences 
can inhibit attributions of perspective-taking to the offender; in this situation we may expect 
higher levels of retribution and/or fear towards the offender than when the consequences of 
bullying are less severe. 
Second, we have argued, but not shown, that appraisals of responsibility for or 
acknowledgement of immoral behaviour tend to elicit moral emotions such as shame, guilt, 
and remorse in the agent (e.g., Roseman, 1984). In Study 3 we therefore include a measure of 
the degree to which the offender is seen to accept responsibility for the wrongdoing and, 
consistent with our reasoning above, we predict that this will mediate the relationship 
between perceived perspective-taking and inferred moral emotions.  
To summarize, we test three alternative possibilities for what determines perceived 
perspective-taking and, through this, conciliation: severity of actual consequences, objective 
match between actual and voiced consequences, or a subjective match. For each of the three 
hypotheses, the relevant conditions would indirectly both increase conciliatory attitudes (i.e., 
trust and forgiveness) and decrease fear and retributive tendencies on the part of the victim. 
This relationship would be sequentially mediated by perceived perspective-taking, perceived 
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Method 
Participants and design. Participants were people from the general public in the 
United Kingdom recruited through Prolific Academic. They were paid £1.75 for their 
participation. Participants who completed the survey in less than 5 minutes were removed 
from the data set as the expected time commitment was between 10 and 15 minutes, 
resulting in a sample size of 138 participants (57% female; Mage = 37.69, SDage =11.55). The 
study used a 2 consequences voiced in offender’s perspective statement (severe, less severe) 
x 2 actual severity of consequences experienced by victim (severe, less severe) between-
subjects design. Participants accessed the questionnaire online by clicking on a link in the 
study advertisement and were randomly assigned to one of the 4 experimental conditions.  
  Stimulus materials and procedure. The scenarios used were similar to those in the 
pilot study, depicting either severe or less severe consequences, and the offender renounced 
future bullying either by voicing severe or less severe consequences for the victim of bullying.  
However, we changed the name of the offender back to Lisa, as in Studies 1 and 2. Similar to 
the previous studies, participants were instructed to imagine being a victimized nurse of 
bullying. The basic scenario was shortened compared to both previous studies by removing 
the content of bullying: ‘Imagine that you are a nurse. You have been employed at this 
hospital for one year. Recently, you have been bullied by other nurses, including a nurse 




Unless otherwise indicated, all questions below were measured on 7-point Likert 
scales anchored at 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Very much). Where possible, ratings for each 
variable were averaged to create composite measures. The dependent measures were the 
same as in Study 2, with the following exceptions. 
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Perceived perspective-taking and empathy. Three items were used to measure perceived 
perspective-taking: “How much do you believe Lisa took your perspective”? , “How much do 
you believe Lisa put herself in your shoes”? and “How much do you believe Lisa considered 
the situation from your point of view”? In addition to assessing the cognitive aspects of 
perceived perspective taking, we included three additional items to measure affective 
empathy (adapted from Batson et al., 1997): “How empathic do you believe Lisa felt for 
you”?, “How concerned do you believe Lisa felt for you”?, and “How moved do you believe 
Lisa felt toward you”? Although cognitive and affective empathy have been demonstrated to 
be discrete, in this case principal components analysis showed one factor (all loadings > .88 
explaining 85.29% of the variance). We therefore included the cognitive and affective items 
together in the measure of perceived perspective-taking (α = .96). 
Perceived responsibility for wrongdoing. After the manipulation check of the severity 
of consequences, we included 4 items that assessed the perceived acknowledgement of, and 
responsibility for, the wrongdoing: “How much do you think Lisa...” “…acknowledges her 
wrongdoing”, “…recognizes her wrongdoing”, “…takes responsibility for her wrongdoing” 
and “…blames herself for her wrongdoing” (α = .92). 
 Fear and retribution. We assessed participants’ fear of the offender and their desire 
for retribution. The 6 items started with: “How do you feel about Lisa” and fear was 
measured with 3 items “fearful”, “afraid”, and “scared” (α = .96). Retribution was assessed 
with 3 items “vengeful”, “resentful”, and “angry” (α = .85). 
 Subjective match. After measuring forgiveness, participants responded to two items 
assessing the perceived divergence between their feelings and the offender’s statement: “To 
what extent did Lisa’s statement overestimate [underestimate] the impact of bullying on your 
feelings?” The ratings of overestimation were subtracted from underestimation, providing a 
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measure of perceived divergence that varies between -6 (extreme overestimation) to +6 
(extreme underestimation) with zero reflecting a perfect match. 
 Reliability values for inferred moral emotions, trust, and forgiveness, were excellent: 
α = .96, α = .82, and α = .87, respectively. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Scale inter-correlations and descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are 
shown in Table 9. Many variables (except for perceived severity of the consequences) were 
significantly inter-correlated. These findings are generally similar to those in Study 1 and 2. 
Moreover, fear and retribution were negatively correlated with the main variables. 
Manipulation check of severity of consequences. A 2 (perspective-taking 
expressing: less severe consequences, severe consequences) × 2 (severity of consequences: 
less severe, severe) between-subjects ANOVA for the severity manipulation check showed, 
as planned, that ratings on felt severity were significantly higher in the severe consequence 
condition (M = 5.79, SD = 1.03) than in the less severe consequence condition (M = 5.12, 
SD = 1.21), F(1, 133) = 12.02, p = .001, ƞp
2 
= .08. The main effect of perspective-taking 
and the interaction between severity and perspective were not significant, F(1, 133) = 1.23, 
p = .269, and F(1, 133) = .03, p = .872, respectively. 
Comparison between conditions. The means and standard deviations for each 
variable as a function of perspective-taking and severity of consequences are presented in 
Table 10. Between-subjects 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent variables and 
the results are presented in Table 11. Below we present only the significant results (non-
significant findings are presented in Table 11). 
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For perceived perspective-taking, the interaction between perspective-taking and 
severity of consequences was significant. When the consequences of bullying were less 
severe, taking the victim’s perspective and voicing severe consequences resulted in stronger 
perceived perspective-taking compared to voicing less severe consequences (p = .041). In 
contrast, when the consequences were severe the difference between the two perspective 
statements was not significant (p = .476; see Table 10). This finding supports the perceived 
subjective matching hypothesis but not the perceived objective matching hypothesis that 
predicted a cross-over interaction between the conditions such that perceived perspective-
taking should be greater when both the actual and voiced consequences are less severe and 
when they are more severe. The finding does also not support the severity of consequences 
hypothesis that predicted a main effect of the severity of consequences condition such that 
perceived perspective-taking should be greater when the actual consequences are less severe 
for the victim than when they are more severe. 
For subjective match, we computed the difference between ratings of underestimation 
and overestimation of Lisa’s statement about the nurse’s feelings. Lower ratings are 
perceived as a better match as they are closer to zero that represents a perfect subjective 
match. The main effect of perspective-taking showed that voicing more severe consequences 
was perceived as a better match than voicing less severe consequences (Ms = .20 vs. 2.15, 
SDs = .94 vs. 1.58, respectively). The main effect of severity of consequences revealed that 
less severe consequences were perceived as a better match than more severe consequences 
(Ms = .36 vs. 1.89, SDs = 1.18 vs. 1.63, respectively). The interaction between perspective-
taking and severity of consequences was significant. When the voiced consequences were 
high, the actual experienced low consequences were perceived as a better match than when 
they were high (p < .001). Likewise, but even more pronounced, when the voiced 
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consequences were low, the actual experienced low consequences were perceived as a better 
match than when they were high (p < .001).  
Next, we tested for each of the 4 conditions whether the difference score deviated 
from zero (reflecting a perfect match). In the condition in which the actual consequences of 
bullying were less severe and the voiced consequences were more severe, the difference 
score did not deviate significantly from zero (p = .107), indicating a perceived match 
between actual and voiced consequences of bullying. The negative direction of the 
difference score points to a (non-significant) overestimation of the victim’s feelings (see row 
2 and column 4 in Table 10). In the other conditions the perceived match differed 
significantly from zero (all ps < .001). The positive difference scores in these conditions 
indicate underestimations of the victim’s feelings (see Table 10). 
The main effects of severity of consequences on fear and forgiveness were significant; 
when the actual consequences were less severe this resulted in less fear (Ms = 3.63 vs. 4.19, 
SDs = 1.61 vs. 1.44, respectively) and more forgiveness (Ms = 3.65 vs. 3.20, SDs = .77 vs. 
.89, respectively), than severe consequences.  
Path Analyses. We used AMOS 22 to test the predicted mediation and its potential 
moderation by severity (see Figure 3). As in Study 2 we conducted a multi-group analysis 
with severity as the grouping variable. We first fixed all structural relations between the 
severity conditions to be equal,  2(36) = 48.15. We compared this with the model in which 
the path from perspective-taking condition to perceived perspective-taking was 
unconstrained,  2(35) = 44.24. The difference between the models was significant, ∆ 2(1) 
=3.91, p = .048, indicating that the less constrained model provided a better overall model fit.  
The model fit for the unconstrained model was good (see Kline, 1998);  2(35) = 
44.24, p = .14,  2/df ratio = 1.26, CFI = .98, and RMSEA = .04. Consistent with the 
subjective matching hypothesis, severity of consequences moderated the relationship between 
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perspective-taking and perceived perspective-taking; when the consequences were less severe 
(but not more severe), taking the perspective of the victim and voicing more severe 
consequences of bullying predicted higher levels of perceived perspective-taking. As such, 
this finding replicates that of Study 2 where we suggested that perceived perspective-taking 
occurred when the perpetrator’s voiced consequences of bullying were more severe than the 
actual consequences experienced by the victim. Further, the relationship between perceived 
perspective-taking and inferred moral emotions was partially mediated by perceived 
responsibility for the wrongdoing (see Figure 3); higher levels of perceived perspective-
taking were associated with stronger attributions of moral emotions in the offender through 
perceptions of offender’s responsibility for the wrongdoing. Stronger inferences of moral 
emotions, in turn, were linked with more trust and forgiveness, as well as with less fear and 
retribution. Table 12 shows that all indirect effects were supported when the consequences 
were less severe and not when the consequences were severe. 
Study 3 therefore finds support for a moderated mediation in line with the subjective 
match hypothesis. When an offender claims to have taken the victim’s perspective and 
expresses a severity of harm caused that is greater than just objectively accurate, this 
promotes trust and forgiveness, and reduces fear and desire for retribution, because the victim 
feels that the offender has taken his/her perspective. This facilitates the attribution of 
responsibility-taking as well as moral emotions to the offender, leading to more conciliatory 
responses of the victim.  
General Discussion 
The main purpose of the present research was to investigate whether an offender (bully) 
taking the perspective of the victim (nurse) may increase the victim’s conciliatory attitudes. 
We argued that this depends on the extent to which victims perceive the offender taking their 
perspective (perceived perspective-taking). In three studies we found that, when victims 
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perceived that their perspective was taken by the offender, trust in (Study 1, 2 and 3) and 
forgiveness for (Study 2 and 3) the offender increased. This occurred because victims 
inferred that the offender had felt moral emotions (shame, guilt, remorse) (Study 1, 2 and 3) 
and accepted responsibility for the wrongdoing (Study 3).  
We also expected that the effects of perspective-taking on conciliatory attitudes would 
be qualified by the severity of the consequences for the victim. We did not observe this effect 
in Study 1, however, we did so in Study 2 where a clearer manipulation of the severity of 
consequences was included. Here we found support for the idea that, when the consequences 
were less severe (rather than severe), taking the victim’s perspective resulted in more 
perceived perspective-taking compared to the offender taking a workplace perspective. 
Consistent with our model, perceived perspective-taking explained the positive association 
between the offender taking the perspective of the victim and perceived moral emotions in 
the offender when the consequences were less severe. Perceived moral emotions were, in 
turn, positively associated with trust and forgiveness.  
Study 3 further clarified why the attribution of perspective-taking depended on the 
severity of the harm caused. It was not the case that more severe harm-doing generally 
reduced victims’ inclination or capacity to attribute perspective-taking to the offender — 
although the existence of a threshold above which victims are unwilling to hold such 
favourable views of the offender cannot be completely ruled out (see Fincham et al., 2005). It 
was also not the case that the offender had to show an accurate appraisal of the severity of the 
harm done, for victims to attribute greater perspective-taking. Instead, what affected 
perceived perspective-taking was that the offender went beyond an objective appraisal of the 
harm done and voiced a severity of consequences that went beyond what the victim actually 
experienced. In the victim’s eyes this might still be represented as a match, a subjective 
match, where the perpetrators’ overly sympathetic expression is considered symbolically 
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appropriate for the harm and hurt caused. Perhaps, while an accurate assessment of the harm 
reflects an objective, detached attitude of the offender, the exaggerated acknowledgment of 
harm (or perhaps the harm that could have been) may express sympathy and concern that is 
more important for attributions of cognitive and affective perspective-taking. 
Interestingly, moral emotions were not expressed by the offender but were rather 
inferred by the participants (Oatley, 1999a, 1999b), to the extent that victims perceived 
offenders to have taken their perspective. Experiences of shame, remorse, and guilt signal a 
willingness to behave better in the future (Radzik, 2009). Thus, when victims attribute these 
emotions to an offender, they may also trust the offender to behave better in the future which 
may then promote conciliatory attitudes.  
Indeed, an intriguing question is whether inferences about offender’s felt emotions 
and offender’s explicit expression of emotions have different effects on the victim. Schmitt, 
Gollwitzer, Förster, and Montada (2004) found that the offender’s objective expression of 
remorse had less impact on the victim’s belief that the offender was remorseful. Rather, 
remorse was inferred from the offender’s acknowledgement of the victim’s suffering. 
Moreover, explicitly expressing moral emotions by offenders is sometimes not believed to be 
genuine by the victims (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008; Wohl, Hornsey, 
& Bennett, 2012), for example when victims believe that outgroup offenders are not capable 
of experiencing uniquely human emotions such as shame and guilt. The research of Giner-
Sorolla et al. (2008), Schmitt et al. (2004), and Wohl et al. (2012) may suggest that offenders 
are not allowed to claim moral emotions (shame, guilt, remorse) but rather that they have to 
demonstrate them and it is the privilege of victims to attribute such emotions to offenders. On 
the other hand, explicit expressions of remorse are considered to be a core element of 
apologies (e.g., Blatz & Philpot, 2010; Lazare, 2004; McCullough Worthington, & Rachal, 
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1997; Montiel, 2000; Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013). More research is 
needed to investigate how remorse is construed by victim groups.  
In broader terms, the current research demonstrates that perspective-taking may be a 
useful strategy in situations of conflict. When offenders are willing to take the perspective of 
their victims into account and to communicate the victims’ experiences, this may prompt 
victims to acknowledge the offender’s perspective-taking effort and respond with greater 
conciliation, promoting more positive outcomes of reconciliation processes. However, care 
should be taken when one takes the victim’s perspective because it is not necessarily a matter 
of accurately assessing how the victim felt or was affected. Rather, as we have shown in 
Study 2 and 3, perspective-taking may need to reflect ‘over-accurately’ the victim’s 
experiences, representing perhaps the worst consequences that could have befallen the victim 
or, qua the emphatic concern this expresses for victims, symbolically addressing the victim’s 
hurt. If not, victims may not perceive perspective-taking and its positive benefits for 
reconciliation may not eventuate. However, it is possible that this conclusion applies 
specifically to victims’ responses to offender claims of perspective-taking, whereas third-
parties, as more detached respondents, may respond positively also to an offender’s more 
accurate appraisal of the harm done; further research is needed to address this issue.  
A limitation of the present research is that we used scenarios that may impact on the 
external validity of our findings. Future research may investigate whether the observed 
relationships would occur amongst real victims of bullying. It is possible, for example, that 
victim-based processes such as retribution and fear would be more pronounced amongst real 
victims, especially shortly after a severe transgression. It is also possible that bullying in 
other contexts (for instance at schools) will reveal different findings due to the age of the 
victims. Research has demonstrated that experiencing bullying at a younger age can have 
long lasting severe effects (e.g., Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Furthermore, it needs to be 
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investigated whether our findings generalize to other forms of transgressions than bullying. It 
is possible that less intentional harm-doings (compared to bullying) have different effects on 
perceived perspective-taking and subsequent conciliatory attitudes. Finally, future research 
may also investigate whether perceived perspective-taking is similarly effective in intergroup 
contexts (i.e. when one group transgresses against another group; Hornsey & Wohl, 2013) 
and whether perceived perspective-taking can be effective in the emotional regulation of 
intractable conflict (Halperin, Cohen-Chen & Goldenberg, 2014).  
Concluding Comments 
The present research contributes to an understanding of perceived perspective-taking 
as an essential mechanism for the positive effects of offender perspective-taking on the 
victim’s conciliatory response. Acknowledging more than accurately, hyperbolically even, 
the victim’s experiences (as a conciliatory gesture) enhances the victims’ feeling that their 
perspective has been taken. This has positive effects on the victims’ conciliatory attitudes, 
triggered by their perceptions of moral emotions in the offender and the offender’s 
acknowledgement of the wrongdoing. Hence this research makes an important contribution to 
the literature on perspective-taking, the emerging literature on the perceived perspective-
taking, and to the literature on the psychological processes that give rise to conciliatory 
attitudes following a conflict. 
Footnotes 
1. We included more dependent variables in the study based on the research of Goldstein et 
al. (2014): ‘self-other overlap’ and ‘liking of the offender’. However, these variables were 
less relevant in a conflict situation. The items that measured ‘perceived empathy’ showed 
a low reliability.  
2. Without re-coding the five outliers, the main effects of perspective-taking and severity of 
consequences were significant, F(1, 118) = 21.01, p < .001, ƞp
2
= .15, and F(1, 118) = 
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12.31, p < .001, ƞp
2
= .10,respectively. The interaction was also significant, F(1, 118) = 
3.97, p = .046, ƞp
2
= .04. 
3. In Study 3 we included the item ‘To what extent do you believe that Lisa’s statement was 
due to concerns about her self-image?” Results from an ANOVA showed that the main 
effects of perspective-taking, severity of consequences, and the interaction were not 
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Figure 1. Path model of perspective-taking and severity of consequences predicting trust. 
Note: Solid lines represent statistically significant paths (p < .05). All other paths were not 
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Figure 2. Path model of severity of consequences condition moderating the mediating role of 
perceived perspective-taking in predicting forgiveness and trust. Values inside brackets 
represent the severe consequence condition. All paths are significant, p < .001, all other 













































Figure 3. Path model of severity of consequences condition moderating the mediating role of perceived perspective-taking in predicting 
forgiveness, trust, fear, and retribution. Values inside brackets represent the severe consequence condition. All paths are significant, p < .05, all 
other paths were non-significant. Forgiveness and trust, r = .39, p < .001; forgiveness and retribution, r = -.68, p < .001; forgiveness and fear, r 




























































This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 


















   
 




































This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Table 2: Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Perspective-taking and 
Severity of Consequences (Study 1) 
 Perspective-taking 
 Victim  Workplace 




n = 38 
Less severe 
n = 31 
Severe 
n = 33 
Less severe 
n = 37 
PPT 3.81 (1.33) 4.58 (1.28) 2.36 (1.36) 2.65 (1.48) 
Inferred moral 
emotions 3.52 (1.42) 3.53 (1.37) 2.45 (.97) 2.60 (1.14) 
Trust 2.14 (.75) 2.57 (1.04) 1.98 (1.03) 2.15 (.86) 
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Table 3: Tests of Indirect Effects (Study 1) 
IV  mediator  DV IE SE 95% CI 
Perspective condition  PPT  INF moral emotions  
trust .37 .08 .24, .56 
Perspective condition  PPT INF moral emotions .86 .16 .53, 1.23 
PPT  INF moral emotions  trust .22 .04 .16, .31 
Severity consequences  PPT  INF moral emotions  
trust 
.12 .05 .03, .24 
Severity consequences  PPT INF moral emotions .27 .12 .06, .54 
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Note. N = 122, ***p < .001, *p < .05, 
#
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Table 5: Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Perspective-taking and 
Severity of Consequences (Study 2) 
 Perspective-taking 
 Victim Workplace 




n = 31 
Less severe 
n = 30 
Severe 
n = 31 
Less severe 
n = 30 
Perceived PT 3.19 (1.08) 4.77 (1.38) 2.68 (1.35) 2.97 (1.33) 
Inferred  moral 
emotions 2.87 (1.25) 4.07 (1.52) 2.19 (1.03) 2.35 (1.00) 
Trust 2.08 (1.06) 2.89 (1.41) 1.90 (.84) 1.81 (.74) 
Forgiveness 3.57 (.78) 3.93 (.91) 3.48 (.67) 3.34 (.76) 
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Table 6: Inferential Statistics and Effect Size (partial
 
ƞ2) as a Function of Perspective-taking 
and Severity of Consequences of Harm for the Victim (Study 2) 
Variable Effect F
1
 p partial η
2
 
Perceived PT PT 24.63 < .001 .17 
 SoC 15.92 < .001 .12 
 PT*SoC 7.57 = .007 .06 
INF moral 
emotions 
PT 29.40 < .001 .20 
 SoC 9.38 = .003 .07 
 PT*SoC 5.54 = .020 .05 
Trust PPT 11.00 = .001 .08 
 SoC 3.67 = .058 .03 
 PT*SoC 5.77 = .018 .05 
Forgiveness PPT 5.76 = .019 .05 
 SoC .57 = .450 .00 
 PT*SoC 3.20 = .076 .03 
Note. 
1
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Table 7: Tests of Indirect Effects (Study 2) 
IV  mediator  DV IE SE 95% CI 
Less severe consequences     
PT  PPT/INF moral emotions  forgiveness .17 .22 .44, 1.30 
PT  PPT/INF moral emotions  trust .36 .12 .18, .68 
PT  PPT  INF moral emotions .84 .07 .07, .35 
Severe consequences  







PT  PPT/INF moral emotions  trust  







Both consequences conditions    
PPT  INF moral emotions  forgiveness .20 .05 .04, .17 
PPT  INF moral emotions  trust .09 .03 .12, .31 
Note. PPT = perceived perspective-taking, PT = perspective-taking, INF=inferred. IE = 
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Table 8: Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Perspective-taking and 
Severity of Consequences (Pilot Study) 
 Actual consequences 
 Less severe consequences More severe consequences 











Perceived match 5.44 (1.73) 3.63 (1.82) 5.81 (1.33) 3.08 (1.72) 
Response 
satisfaction 
3.71 (1.92) 4.61 (1.36) 3.81 (1.36) 2.35 (1.38) 
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Table 9: Scale Inter-Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Study 3)  
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Manipulation severity          
2 Perceived PT .05         
3. Subjective match .31
***
 -.06        




 -.13       




      






     








    




























M 5.46 3.90 1.14 4.13 3.55 3.92 4.26 2.74 3.42 
SD 1.17 1.56 1.61 1.42 1.44 1.55 1.42 1.09 .86 
Note. N = 138, ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, 
#
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Table 10: Means (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Perspective-taking and 
Severity of Consequences (Study 3) 
 Perspective-taking with voicing 
 Less severe consequences More severe consequences 




n = 34 
Less severe 
n = 33 
Severe 
n = 37 
Less severe 
n = 34 
Perceived PT 4.02 (1.46) 3.51 (1.52) 3.76 (1.71) 4.29 (1.47) 
Subjective match 3.26 (1.14) 1.00 (1.06) .62 (.72) -.26 (.93) 
Perceived 
responsibility 4.08 (1.29) 4.01 (1.59) 4.12 (1.64) 4.29 (1.15) 
INF moral 
emotions 3.59 (1.25) 3.22 (1.53) 3.62 (1.58) 3.74 (1.39) 
Fear 4.04 (1.26) 3.48 (1.69) 4.32 (1.60) 3.77 (1.54) 
Retribution 4.60 (1.34) 4.00 (1.49) 4.35 (1.38) 4.08 (1.48) 
Trust 2.76 (1.01) 2.64 (1.09) 2.79 (1.21) 2.75 (1.09) 
Forgiveness 3.12 (.73) 3.65 (.73) 3.27 (1.03) 3.64 (.82) 
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Table 11: Inferential Statistics and Effect Size (partial
 
ƞ2) as a Function of Perspective-
taking and Severity of Consequences of Harm for the Victim (Study 3) 
Variable Effect F
1
 p partial η
2
 
Perceived PT PT .95 = .330 .01 
 SoC .00 = .965 .00 
 PT*SoC 3.90 = .050 .03 
Subjective match PT 139.89 < .001 .51 
 SoC 85.48 < .001 .40 
 PT*SoC 17.40 < .001 .12 
Perceived responsibility PT .45 = .505 .00 
 SoC .04 = .840 .00 
 PT*SoC .25 = .616 .00 
Inferred moral emotions PT 1.27 = .262 .01 
 SoC .25 = .617 .00 
 PT*SoC .98 = .323 .01 
Fear PT 1.21 = . 273 .01 
 SoC 4.48 =. 036 .03 
 PT*SoC .00 = .993 00 
Retribution PT .12 = .729 .00 
 SoC 3.23 = .075 .02 
 PT*SoC .45 = .503 .00 
Trust PPT .15 = .697 .00 
 SoC .19 = .659 .00 
 PT*SoC .06 = .810 .00 
Forgiveness PPT .22 = .642 .00 
 SoC 9.86 = .002 .07 
 PT*SoC .28 = .596 .00 
Note. 
1
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Table 12: Tests of Indirect Effects (Study 3) 
IV  mediator  DV IE SE 95% CI 
Less severe consequences     
PT  PPT/responsible*/emotions** forgiveness .13 .07 .02, .29 
PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  trust .28 .13 .02, .55 
PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  fear -.11 .08 -.35, -.00 
PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  retribution -.16 .10 -.42, -.02 
PT  PPT/ responsible  emotions .51 .25 .03, 1.01 
PT  PPT  responsible .52 .25 .03, 1.02 
Severe consequences  








PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  trust -.09 .13 -.36, .17 
PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  fear .04 .07 -.05, .24 
PT  PPT/ responsible/emotions  retribution .05 .08 -.09, .25 
PT  PPT/ responsible  emotions -.17 .25 -.64, .32 
PT  PPT  responsible -.18 .26 -.68, .31 
Both consequences conditions    
PPT  responsible/emotions  forgiveness 
 
.17 .04 .11, .25 
 
PPT  responsible emotions  trust 
 
.35 .04 .27, .44 
 
PPT  responsible/emotions  fear 
 
-.14 .07 -.28, -.01 
 
PPT  responsible/emotions  retribution 
 
-.21 .06 -.34, -.09 
 
PPT  responsible  emotions 
 
.38 .06 .27, .51 
 
Responsible  emotions  forgiveness 
 
.15 .03 .09, .23 
 
Responsible  emotions  trust 
 
.31 .05 .21, .41 
 
Responsible  emotions  fear 
 
-.12 .06 -.26, -.01 
 
Responsible  emotions  retribution 
 
-.18 .06 -.31, -.08 
 
Note. PPT = perceived perspective-taking, PT = perspective-taking, *=perceived 
responsibility, **= inferred moral emotions. IE = indirect effect; SE = standard error 
 
